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ABSTRACT 
 
Rights of assembly and freedom of speech are a rich ground for decision-
making by police, prosecutors and courts in determining a balance with 
obligations of authorities to keep the peace and prevail against disorderly 
conduct or riot. Recent claims of abuse of police powers through “kettling” 
have reached the European Court of Justice. These cases directly address the 
scope and exercise of police authority in maintaining order during 
demonstrations. Yet not only police powers are in issue at times of political 
disputation. Two cases heard early last century by the Australian High Court 
illustrate the way in which both the decision to prosecute and judicial 
decision-making may be influenced by socio-political considerations, 
particularly in time of war. Pankhurst v Porter and Pankhurst v Kiernan saw 
Adela Pankhurst, youngest daughter in the redoubtable Pankhurst family of 
Suffragette fame, testing the limits of the law during the struggles to ensure 
that sending wheat abroad to feed the troops would not justify pricing bread 
out of the reach of ordinary, working-class households. The success of the 
appeal in Pankhurst v Porter exposed error in the prosecutorial process. The 
failure of the appeal in Pankhurst v Kiernan exposed flawed reasoning in the 
majority opinion and the strength of the dissenting judgment in it’s 
application of the law to the facts and the need to maintain objectivity or at 
least neutrality as to the particular appellant. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Engagement in war almost inevitably triggers developments in the law 
relating to freedom of association and the right to demonstrate. Most recently 
in the United Kingdom this has centred on demonstrations against the war in 
                                                     
∗ The Hon Dr Jocelynne A Scutt, Barrister & Human Rights Lawyer, Visiting Fellow, 
Lucy Cavendish College, University of Cambridge, Visiting Professor, University of 
Buckingham. 
ADELA PANKHURST IN THE AUSTRALIAN HIGH COURT 
 
 
66 
Iraq and invasion of Afghanistan, particularly where “kettling” has been 
employed by police to “manage” crowds. The use of police cordons to contain 
large numbers of protestors, so as to prevent their leaving an area, sometimes 
for hours, has been asserted as false imprisonment and/or a breach of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (the Convention). The Convention 
asserts that there is an absolute right not to be deprived of liberty unless 
particular, well-defined situations or circumstances exist. The question 
therefore arises as to whether kettling constitutes unlawful conduct on the part 
of police. 
In Austin v Metropolitan Police Commissioner1 the issue arose in the 
context of anti-capitalist protests in London in 2001. As a precursor to cases 
involving kettling and anti-war protestors, the Austin case has gone through 
the United Kingdom courts to the European Court of Justice, the argument 
centring upon whether such containment can be justified where police believe 
all held inside the cordon are demonstrators poised to commit a breach of the 
peace. In 2007 the Court of Appeal upheld the first instance determination 
that the police action was justified through their perception of “imminent 
risk”. Kettling constituted deprivation of liberty amounting to false 
imprisonment, said the Court, unless the threshold test of “immediate risk or 
imminence” was met. Once immediate risk or imminence was found, then, so 
long as the force was proportionate to prevent a breach of the peace, kettling 
was lawful. 
In 2009 this approach was upheld by the House of Lords.2 However, the 
argument has not ended there. The issue is going on appeal to the European 
Court of Justice, a principal contention being that if used effectively, the 
Public Order Act 1986 eliminates the need for kettling so that the 
imprisonment of demonstrators inherent in this “management” method 
remains unlawful, except in exceptional circumstances. If, contrary to or at the 
same time as applying the Public Order Act, police planning includes an 
intention to contain demonstrators in cordons depriving them of the right to 
move, this will eliminate the contention of “imminence” and “risk”. 
It is not only in contemporary times, however, that the use and potential 
abuse of institutional power have arisen for legal consideration. Austin 
illustrates the need for courtroom surveillance of the action of policing 
authorities in handling of demonstrations. There, the focus was on action that 
may ignore or overlook existing rights of police control under the law, when 
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authorities seek to extend police power and lawful state action beyond that 
required for maintenance of peace and good order. Yet problems go beyond 
police power, as two cases, almost one hundred years ago, illustrate. 
Pankhurst v Porter3 and Pankhurst v Kiernan4 confirm that scrutiny must 
extend to both the determination to prosecute and judicial decision-making.  
Both cases were heard by the Australian High Court in 1917. In Pankhurst 
v Porter,5 the question focused upon whether prosecution under a provision of 
the federal defence laws was sound. Here, the role of the prosecutor was 
under review. In Pankhurst v Kiernan,6 the challenged charge was again 
under federal defence law. However, here, the question was whether the court 
itself might, in its judgment, be swayed by socio-political circumstances to 
make what was, ultimately, an unsustainable decision. Analysis of the 
judgments of the majority and that of the lone dissenter indicates that just as 
police and prosecutors may be swayed by socio-political circumstances in 
times of upheaval and unrest, judges are not immune. 
 
PANKHURST V PORTER – THE DECISION TO PROSECUTE 
 
In England, Adela Pankhurst worked as a trainee teacher in an 
economically impoverished area before joining her mother Emmeline 
Pankhurst and sisters Christabel and Sylvia in the Suffragette cause.7 Her 
arrival in Australia did not dissuade her from agitation. Working-class poverty 
was at the nub of the demonstration bringing her before the Victorian Court of 
Petty Sessions in August 1917. 
According to the police prosecutor, “between five and six thousand” 
attended the rally, a protest against the rising price of bread. Wheat was being 
sent to Europe to feed the allied troops, affecting domestic supply. The 
magistrate was told that “shortly after three o’clock” on the day in question, 
Adela Pankhurst, Alice Suter and Jennie Baines, together with “several other 
women” appeared in the Treasury Gardens.8 According to the police 
prosecutor, Adela: 
                                                     
3 [1917] HCA 52; (1917) 23 CLR 504 (2 October 1917). 
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“… got up on a seat and addressed the people assembled, and told 
them all to follow her to Parliament House in defiance of the police 
and to break in if necessary, and see what Billy Hughes [the Prime 
Minister] was going to do to get cheaper food for the starving 
people.”9 
 
Thereupon: 
 
“The crowd surged round the seat and the said Adela Constantia Mary 
Pankhurst was pushed off it, and then Alice Suter got up on the seat 
and commenced to address the people assembled, and she in turn was 
pushed off the seat, and also Jennie Baines was pushed off the seat, 
and then Adela Constantia Mary Pankhurst and Alice Suter and Jennie 
Baines went towards the steps of Parliament House arm-in-arm, and 
followed by the crowd of people.”10 
 
Police then arrested the trio, who were prosecuted under regulation 27 of 
the 1916 War Precautions (Supplementary) Regulations, made on 14 August 
1917. Regulation 27 being used against protestors for the first time meant the 
High Court faced a test case. The regulation stated:   
 
1) It shall not be lawful for any number of persons exceeding twenty 
to meet in the open air in any part of the proclaimed place for any 
unlawful purpose or for the purpose or on the pretext of making 
known their grievances or of discussing public affairs or of 
considering or of presenting or preparing any petition memorial 
complaint remonstrance declaration or other address to His Majesty or 
to the Governor-General or to both Houses or either House of the 
Parliament of the Commonwealth. 
 
The Treasury Gardens was a “proclaimed place”. Hence, the Court had to 
address the words immediately following, the charge alleging the woman had, 
together with others (exceeding the requirement of “twenty”) met “on the 
pretext of making known their grievances …” Justice Barton, with whom the 
other judges (Isaacs, Higgins, Gavan Duffy, Powers and Rich JJ) agreed, said 
the Court had to give regard to the context in which the words appeared. The 
drafting required that the phrase “for any unlawful purpose or for the purpose 
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or on the pretext …” must be considered “in whole”.11 Was “there … 
evidence which should have satisfied the Magistrate, or upon which the 
Magistrate might properly have been satisfied, that the appellant was one of 
twenty or more persons who had assembled “on the pretext of making known 
their grievances”.12  
Barton J said he could “imagine a case where the word ‘pretext’ would 
mean the real or ostensible purpose”.13 In the present case, however, “pretext” 
was “by the context clearly distinguished from other words in the regulation”. 
First, the words “for any unlawful purpose” appeared, clearly meaning a 
“real” object, being an unlawful one. Next came the words “or for the 
purpose”, with the word “purpose” being “prima facie … used in the same 
sense as before, that is to say, as meaning the real purpose”: for example, a 
real purpose of making known grievances.14 Immediately after, came the 
words (employed in the informations against all three) “or on the pretext”.  
As to this, Barton J said: 
 
“…as a matter of construction the collocation in which the word 
‘pretext’ is used shows that it is used in contradistinction to the word 
‘purpose’. In that case the words ‘for the purpose or on the pretext’ 
indicate that the persons who have assembled have done so either for 
the real purpose of making known their grievances or on the pretext, 
and not really with the purpose, of making known their grievances.”15 
 
The regulation used “purpose” and “pretext”. Therefore, he observed 
(“or” making them alternatives), it was necessary to find separate meanings 
for those words. It could not be said, in the context, that “pretext” and 
“purpose” were identical: “pretext” did not have the meaning of “purpose”: 
 
“Being of that opinion, what is the next inference? When persons have 
assembled on the ‘pretext’ of making known their grievances, and not 
for the real purpose of making them known, there is a sham. There is, 
in such a use of the two terms, a concealment, or a screen, connoted 
by the word ‘pretext’ which is not connoted by the direct and frank 
word ‘purpose’. Reading the regulation in that way, as I think we 
must, the question is what evidence there is here that the purpose for 
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13 [1917] HCA 52, at 2. 
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which the persons were assembled was not the true purpose; in other 
words, that they were assembled on a mere pretext.”16  
 
To his own question: “Does that evidence show that the people, however 
wrong their object, were there holding forth a sham as the reason of their 
meeting when their real purpose was a different one?” Barton J said: 
 
“I do not think that, whatever may be the fact, the evidence shows 
that. This Court, it must be remembered, is here not for the purpose of 
expressing its opinion upon the propriety or impropriety of the 
conduct of the appellants, but to determine the meaning of the 
regulation, and whether the Magistrate was justified in finding that the 
charge with which the appellants have been confronted had been 
proved. I do not think that anyone hearing the evidence which I have 
just read would say that there is anything in it upon which the ordinary 
reasonable mind could conclude that the persons at the meeting were 
there, not with the object of finding out from the authorities what steps 
were to be taken to provide cheaper food, but for an ulterior purpose 
which the cry for cheaper food was merely used to disguise. They are 
not shown to have been putting forward a sham, and this Court is 
concerned only with the matter of proof. It seems to me that if we 
were to hold that the object of these persons was falsely stated, that 
they had some ulterior object such as to break the law or gain 
notoriety, we should come to a conclusion unsupported by the 
evidence. We cannot do that.”17  
 
Barton J then summed up: 
 
• in the regulation “pretext” has a different meaning from “purpose”; 
• “purpose” refers to the real object; 
• “pretext” refers to the professed and not to the genuine object, or to 
something done under a screen, or a sham.18  
 
Therefore, the convictions of Adela Pankhurst, Alice Suter and Jennie 
Baines, being founded upon charges of breaching the regulation by engaging 
in a “pretext”, should be quashed. Nonetheless, said Barton J, had it been 
alleged in the information that they “were assembled ‘for the purpose’ of 
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making known their grievances”, then on the evidence before the court it was 
possible that they “might have been properly convicted”.  
 
PANKHURST V KIERNAN - JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING 
 
On 9 October 1917, a Police Magistrate at Melbourne Petty Sessions 
sentenced Adela Pankhurst to four months imprisonment with the option of a 
bond whereby she would undertake not to offend against the Unlawful 
Associations Act 1916-1917 (Cth) nor attend to speak at any meeting of more 
than 15 persons without the consent, in advance, of the federal Attorney-
General or Solicitor General or a Police Magistrate. Initially, Pankhurst’s 
defence counsel said she would comply with these conditions. Upon her 
subsequent appearance she opted for prison.19 
Adela Pankhurst was charged that on 20 September 1917 she had, at 
Yarraville in the western suburbs of Melbourne, “encouraged the injury of 
property”. The information stated that this was contrary to section 4 of the 
Unlawful Associations Act: 
 
“Whoever advocates or encourages, or incites or instigates to the 
taking or endangering of human life, or the destruction or injury of 
property, shall be guilty of an offence. Penalty: Imprisonment for six 
months.” 
 
Before an audience numbered by police at some 2,000, Pankhurst 
delivered a speech at a local Yarraville hall, held to assist dependants of men 
affected by industrial upheaval. Constable McLeod, attending with Constable 
Kiernan, recorded the speech in shorthand, putting in evidence parts which, he 
told the Magistrate, constituted “only a small part” of what Adela Pankhurst 
had said. He added that so far as he knew no one had as a result of the speech 
destroyed any property. Although shorter and not identical with those of his 
fellow officer, Constable Kiernan’s notes were in evidence too. He said he 
“missed more” and could write sentences “here and there” only, so had not 
been able to commit as much to writing as Constable McLeod. This was the 
prosecution evidence. The defence called no evidence.20 
As in Pankhurst v Porter, the same six judges sat: Barton, Isaacs, Higgins, 
Gavan Duffy, Powers and Rich JJ. Two grounds were addressed: 
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• Whether section 4 of the Unlawful Associations Act was valid;21 and 
• Whether the evidence sustained the proposition that Adela Pankhurst 
“advocated or encouraged, or incited or instigated … the destruction 
or injury of property”. 
 
All judges agreed that on the evidence the last ground could not succeed. 
As to the first, Higgins J alone dissented. In a separate judgment, Isaacs J 
agreed with the majority, whilst in short concurrences, Powers J stated his 
agreement with Barton and Isaacs JJ, with Gavan Duffy and Rich JJ each 
relying upon an earlier case, Farey v. Burvett.22   
As to advocating, encouraging, inciting or instigating destruction or injury 
of property, the last ground, Barton J referred to R v Most,23 where in the 
context of criminal libel – seeking to stir others to murder the reigning heads 
of Europe – Huddleston, B said “encourage” encompassed “to intimate, to 
incite to anything, to give courage to, to inspirit, to embolden, to realise 
confidence, to make confident”. Barton J said these words were not 
exhaustive, nor in any sense a statutory definition. They might provide 
assistance in determining what the legislature meant in using the word 
“encourage” but in any event, he went on, “the word ‘encourage’ … is plain 
enough and needs no definition”: 
 
“The applicant's speech cannot be read without perceiving that it was 
an encouragement, within the meaning of the words quoted, of the 
injury of property … The applicant suggested, and tried to induce, the 
continuance of window-breaking. She showed her approbation of –
nay, her exultation in – the doing of damage to the value of £5,000 by 
the smashing of windows on the previous night. If that was not 
encouragement, what was it? … After urging that the makers of 
excess profits could ‘easily stand a strike’, and that the Government 
was careless so far as she and her hearers were concerned, she said 
these words: – ‘We had to adopt other methods;  you saw the results 
of it last night. Panes of glass smashed, – anyway glass windows have 
got no feeling whatever. Now, friends, if we can hold out we feel we 
have got the Government in a cleft stick ... The very fact that the 
people know that they’ (the  Government) ‘are going to get rid of me 
is stirring them’ (the people) ‘up to more efforts ... There was £5,000 
worth of damage done, and five persons arrested. One person for 
                                                     
21 A third ground, that the prosecution and conviction breached section 80 of the 
Constitution – the right to trial by jury, was not pursued by Pankhurst’s counsel. 
22 Farey v Burvett [1916] HCA 36; (1916) 21 CLR 433 (8 June 1916). (Page citations 
are from the [1916] HCA 36 online reference.) 
23 R v Most (1881) 7 QBD 244. 
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every £1,000 worth of damage. Supposing he’ (Mr Hughes [the Prime 
Minister]) ‘does send some of us to gaol, there will be others to take 
their places, and it will take a year or two to build gaols to hold us’.”24 
 
Pankhurst had, according to the record, told the crowd that if the military 
were called out, “the chances were they would shoot the other way, and if Mr 
Hughes [the Prime Minister] got some of them to shoot the result would be a 
failure to obtain recruits”. Then: 
 
“You touch their pockets and you will immediately begin to get 
something. Therefore, friends, we say to keep on in that way ... The 
time is coming when the workers are going to say: – We will no 
longer allow our wealth to be in the hands of a few private individuals. 
We will no longer allow production to be carried on for profits.”25 
 
These extracts “speak for themselves”, said Barton J. Finding that 
“encouragement to destroy or injure property” was clear, he concluded:  
 
“I decline to give serious consideration to the view that there was not 
evidence on which the Police Magistrate could properly find that the 
utterances of the applicant amounted to the forbidden encouragement 
within the meaning of the section. They were much more than ample 
to sustain such a finding.”26  
 
The case then turned on section 4: to sustain the conviction, the law under 
which Pankhurst was gaoled had to be within the power of the federal 
Parliament. The Commonwealth relied on section 51 of the Constitution and 
particularly the defence power: 
 
“The Parliament shall, subject to this Constitution, have power to 
make laws for the peace, order, and good government of the 
Commonwealth with respect to:  
 
…(vi)  the naval and military defence of the Commonwealth and of 
the several States, and the control of the forces to execute and 
maintain the laws of the Commonwealth;  
 
…(xxxix) matters incidental to the execution of any power vested by 
this Constitution in the Parliament or in either House thereof, or in the 
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ADELA PANKHURST IN THE AUSTRALIAN HIGH COURT 
 
 
74 
Government of the Commonwealth, or in the Federal Judicature, or in 
any department or officer of the Commonwealth.” 
 
In upholding the conviction and thereby finding that the Commonwealth 
had the power to make the relevant law, Barton J relied upon Farey v Burvett 
(the Bread Case).27  
Regulations and an order made under the War Precautions Act 1914-1916 
(Cth) fixed the maximum price of bread in proclaimed areas. In Farey v 
Burvett the High Court, a full bench constituted by the same six judges 
together with Griffith CJ, said (albeit Higgins J held more narrowly) the order 
was valid under the defence power. The provision in question was “thought 
desirable” by the Governor-General in Council “for the more effectual 
prosecution of the War or more effectual defence of the Commonwealth or of 
the realm, prescribing and regulating … (b) the conditions (including times, 
places, and prices) of the disposal or use of any property, goods, articles or 
things of any kind; and (c) the requisitioning of any goods, articles, or things 
of any kind”.  
In revisiting Farey v Burvett, Barton J said that the while an Act or 
regulation “might not be a measure of defence in time of peace, it might be 
such a measure in time of war”. He referred to the present war, saying that in 
it “not merely armies but whole nations are engaged in a supreme struggle, 
which so far as this Empire is concerned is a struggle for the preservation of 
liberty”. He concluded it would be “impossible to say that in such a struggle 
every part of the Empire was not entitled”, and, indeed, even called upon, “to 
put forth the whole of the resources of its people in men, money, or property, 
for its self-preservation”. Hence: 
 
“If a measure were capable of contributing to the common defence, it 
was for the Court to affirm that capability … [W]hether it did so 
contribute was a question for the … Legislature. If that body came to 
such a conclusion by passing an Act, then the function of this Court in 
deciding whether it was constitutionally valid was to say whether the 
form of law had been given to something which was capable of 
assisting in defence … In the particular case a measure for the 
conservation of the food supply, or one for the prevention of 
inordinate profits on its sale, or one for the better provisioning of the 
people, might or might not be necessary. The Court was to say 
whether in conceivable circumstances of war it might be so … there 
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its functions stopped. Whether it was in fact necessary or wise in the 
particular instance was for the Legislature to determine.”28 
 
This principle was not “confined to questions of food supply” but 
extended to “all the resources of a people” which may need, in wartime, to 
“be placed by Parliament at the disposal of the Government for purposes of 
defence if they are capable of subserving those purposes”. The 
Commonwealth Parliament was, Barton J said, competent to pass “such 
legislation as may prevent any hampering or dislocation of the work of 
effectively prosecuting the War, that is, the defence of the country”, and it is 
“not difficult to see that internal disorder may have such results”. The 
destruction of property came within this competency for it “may diminish the 
resources of the people applicable to their defence”, just as may “the wilful 
taking or endangering of human life”.29  
In Adela Pankhurst’s case, however, there was no issue of punishing such 
“inroads upon life or property”. Rather, it was about “the advocacy or 
encouragement of, and incitements or instigations to, these acts”. This, 
concluded Barton J, is a matter of public disorder and incitement to public 
disorder: 
 
“The preamble [to the provisions in question] asserts that an 
association known as the Industrial Workers of the World and 
members thereof have been concerned in advocating and inciting to 
the commission of divers crimes and offences, and that it is expedient 
for the effective prosecution of the present war that laws shall be 
enacted for the suppression of such practices. It is to continue in force 
for the duration of the present war and a period of six months 
thereafter, but no longer … The Industrial Workers of the World, and 
also any association which, by its constitution or propaganda, 
advocates or encourages, or incites or instigates to, the taking or 
endangering of human life, or the destruction or injury of property, are 
declared to be unlawful associations … Other sections deal with … 
promotion of actions calculated to interfere with the production, 
manufacture or transport of troops, munitions of war or foodstuffs;  … 
the addition of deportation [as a] punishment …;  the printing or 
publishing of any writing encouraging, &c., the taking or endangering 
of human life or the destruction or injury of property; and … the 
making of regulations not inconsistent with the Act for giving it better 
effect.”30  
                                                     
28 [1917] HCA 63, at 2. 
29 [1917] HCA 63, at 3. 
30 [1917] HCA 63, at 4. 
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Under the Act, “the associations declared unlawful” and “the things made 
punishable” were, for Barton J “… such as may easily tend in greater or less 
degree to the hampering or dislocation of the proper conduct of the defence of 
Australia to the extent that such defence is in the hands of Parliament or 
Government”.31  
In his view, the High Court’s responsibility was to say “whether they are 
capable of so tending”. If “yes”, then any enquiry by the High Court “into the 
necessity, or the propriety, or the wisdom of the action” of the law passed “in 
affirmance of the fact of such tendency or in provision of means for its 
suppression” would be “trespassing” upon the legislative realm. As the 
provisions of the Unlawful Associations Act were “calculated to aid, be it 
much or little, the provisions in the War Precautions Act” and so “to aid the 
purpose of defence”, they were valid.32 Hence, for him – and the judges 
agreeing with him, Pankhurst was rightly convicted and imprisoned. 
Yet it is the clash between Isaacs and Higgins JJ which proves the most 
telling. Albeit it was crucial, Barton J did not asked whether the actual focus 
of the advocacy – smashing windows – was relevant to the defence power. 
Isaacs J did. Nevertheless for him, too, there was “not the least doubt” as to 
the validity of section 4.33 Saying the position of Pankhurst’s counsel was 
“hopeless”, Isaacs J too, found both legal and practical support in Farey v 
Burvett:34   
 
• First, in its reliance upon the English Privy Council case The 
Zamora;35  
 
• Secondly, in its reference to the US Federal Food Control Act – 
which penalised the offence of “knowingly to commit waste, or 
wilfully to permit preventable deterioration of any necessaries in or in 
connection with their production, manufacture or distribution”, and 
“any agreement to exact excessive prices”.36 
 
The difference between Isaacs and Higgins JJ centred on the terms of 
section 4 in its application to Adela Pankhurst’s rabble rousing, and the scope 
                                                     
31 [1917] HCA 63, at 4. 
32 [1917] HCA 63, at 6. 
33 [1917] HCA 63, at 5. 
34 Bread Case [1916] HCA 36;  21 CLR 433 (also cited as Farey v Burvett). 
35 In the Matter of Part Cargo ex Steamship Zamora (Appeal No 109 of 1915) v The 
High Court of Justice Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Divisions (in Prize)(The 
Zamora) [1916] UKPC 24;  [1916] 2 AC 77 (7 April 1916). 
36 [1917] HCA 63, at 5. 
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of section 51 (vi) and (xxxix) taking into account the division of power 
between the Commonwealth and the states. Isaacs J sought to support the 
provision by reference to “the general intent of the whole instrument, by what 
precedes and what follows it …” which, he said, was “quite distinct from the 
ordinary criminal law of the State”. Consistent with Isaac J’s view that the 
section was valid and properly applied against Adela Pankhurst, this 
distinction was crucial – and Isaacs J could not avoid it, for generally both 
property and crime are a matter for the states, not for the Commonwealth. 
Isaacs J went on, therefore, to observe that the Act was “directed primarily 
against unlawful associations”, but “directed against unlawful associations 
because of aims and objects inimical to the national capacity for defence”: 
 
“That means that what the Act really strikes at as dangerous to the 
general welfare is the system, or method, or principle, or doctrine, or 
propaganda, or whatever it may be called, by which human life and 
property are to be injured or destroyed, not as an isolated instance 
disconnected with every other criminal act, but as a systematic course 
of conduct, for the attainment it may be of desired political or 
economic or social ends.”37 
 
For Isaacs J, nothing illustrated this better than Pankhurst’s own language. 
He said that the section “no doubt includes incitement to destroy or injure in 
particular instances”: 
 
“[I]t would reach to an incitement to kill one man or break one 
window; 73but that would be because the incitement there is part of a 
general plan or system. It would be as distinct from an ordinary 
isolated crime dependent on its own origin and confined to its own 
circumstances, as the instances of German atrocities forming part of 
their national system of “frightfulness” are distinct from the ordinary 
local incidents of war. The wholesale smashing of windows was seen 
by [Pankhurst] to be – and, indeed, it is on the surface – a thing which 
must surely lead to public insecurity and to the eventual hampering of 
all transactions in even the necessaries of life, and consequently, if 
Farey v Burvett is good law, this is a much more obvious case for 
Federal interference.”38 
 
Finally, for Isaacs J, the section showed its “clear design” for “the 
preservation of Australian life and property generally”. These being 
“obviously essentials for national defence”, the contention of invalidity must 
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fail. As her language “clearly … fell within it”, therefore, so should the 
appeal: 
 
“If any question were possible as to any particular suggested property 
being necessary or not, I think the principles laid down in the Bread 
Case …, and still more authoritatively affirmed by Lord Parker for 
the Privy Council in the case of The Zamora …, would furnish a 
complete answer.”39 
 
Yet the majority judgment must be looked at against Higgins J’s dissent.  
Having agreed there was evidence on which the Police Magistrate “could 
fairly find that [Pankhurst], by her speech, encouraged people to injure 
property by breaking windows, &c., in Melbourne”, Higgins J said that for the 
law’s purposes, “it does not matter that [she] hoped to force attention to the 
needs of the poor”. However, there was substance in the ground that section 4 
“was ultra vires”. The federal Parliament, he observed, has no power to make 
laws regarding property, or for the protection of property: private property 
was a matter for state laws.40 Nonetheless, it was “urged that the section is 
valid under the [defence] power, and with respect to ‘matters incidental to the 
execution’ of this power”. But what connection did smashing windows have 
with defence of the nation? Higgins J said: 
 
“At first sight, the argument is startling to common sense. How can an 
Act providing for the protection of private windows from unruly 
citizens be treated as an Act ‘with respect to’ the defence of the 
Commonwealth – defence from the foreign enemy and his adherents? 
The property in question is not even property of the Defence 
Department. No doubt every good thing that we get under our internal 
policy contributes to the strength of the nation against aggression. 
Civic peace contributes;  but so do good sewerage, good education, a 
good tramway system. But Acts on these subjects are surely not Acts 
                                                     
39 [1917] HCA 63, at 6. The Zamora [1916] UKPC 24;  [1916] 2 AC 77 involved 
questions of “prize” in the taking into possession of a neutral ship transporting cargo 
to Germany (during the first world war), part at least thereof which was munitions or 
products suitable to the war effort. The Privy Council was concerned with matters of 
international law and the “Prize Court”, its jurisdiction, power and the scope of 
various regulations and orders. There was no question as to state versus federal laws 
or matters going to the division of powers in a federal system. The case canvassed the 
scope of powers in time of war and the nature of defence in the context of 
international and “prize” law. 
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‘with respect to ... the naval and military defence of the 
Commonwealth’. The connection is too indirect and remote.”41 
 
Turning to Farey v Burvett, he noted that the finding of validity lay in the 
War Precautions Act 1914-1916 (Cth) insofar as it provided, by regulation, 
“limits for the price of bread in certain populous localities”. This turned on the 
nature of war: 
 
“Defence is a matter of force – force to be used against the enemy; 
and if that force is likely to be diminished by scarcity of bread, by 
excessive prices of bread, or dissipated in the riots which so 
commonly accompany the want of bread, it may well be a defence 
measure to keep the price of bread low. As in the case of a besieged 
city it may well be necessary or expedient, for the purposes of 
defence, to provide for sufficient food for all the inhabitants, and at 
fixed prices. Moreover, the very sub-section of the War Precautions 
Act which gave the power to make regulations fixing prices … 
specified ‘the more effectual defence of the Commonwealth’ as an 
object to be aimed at by the regulations. In short, Parliament treated 
the fixing of prices as conducing to the defence of the 
Commonwealth; and, in my opinion, we are bound to accept the 
statement of Parliament that it does so conduce unless we can see that 
the statement is obviously untrue or absurd.”42  
 
That the federal Parliament in the Bread Case legislated expressly “with 
respect to” defence was compelling. Explicit reference to “defence” 
eliminated any enquiry by the High Court as to “whether the measure is 
effectual or futile, wise or unwise”. That was for the Parliament. Neither, he 
said, was it for the High Court “to listen to evidence as to the necessity of the 
measure under the circumstances”.43  
This did not mean that the absence of such “defence” reference was fatal. 
Still, the ordinary rules of interpretation required that it be “clear on the face 
of the instruments” that the Parliament intended: 
 
• that the price of bread should be fixed for the purposes of defence;  
and 
• that the donee meant to use the power conferred by section 51(vi). 
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When, “under ordinary circumstances” a law is within the competence of 
state Parliaments alone, said Higgins J, yet the federal Parliament passes 
legislation entering the state’s sphere, “clarity on the  law’s face” is “all the 
more vital”.44 
In the present case, he pointed out, state legislation already existed. Under 
the federal Act, the penalty was six months’ imprisonment. Under the Crimes 
Act 1915 (Victoria), as an “abettor or counsellor of a misdemeanour”, 
Pankhurst could have suffered two years’ imprisonment. So “not only could 
the states make laws with respect to protection of properties within their state 
boundaries”; they had done so. This contrasted with the position vis-à-vis 
bread: the states could not systematically regulate bread prices throughout 
Australia. To control them across the country, bread prices would have to be 
framed on “some uniform, general scheme” – which the federal Parliament 
alone could do.45  
Distinguishing bread prices from property protection, Higgins J re-
emphasised the need for a link between the defence power and the provisions: 
 
“The connection between the power to defend Australia and 
maintaining the fighting force of Australia in full strength by 
regulations as to bread is direct and obvious; the connection between 
the power to defend Australia and the protection of property in the 
several States from injury is indirect and remote.”46  
 
Saying he did not now decide one way or the other, Higgins J observed 
that if the federal Parliament had replicated the War Precautions Act wording 
– expressly stating that the provision in question was for the “defence” of 
Australia, then it may be that the High Court could be bound to accept it. But 
Parliament had not. Turning to what the Act did say, Higgins J noted that the 
reference to the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) had no application to 
Adela Pankhurst, for she was not a member of the IWW and it was not 
suggested she was: 
 
“But the point is that Parliament has not purported to legislate under 
the defence power … It purports, indeed, to make the law “for the 
effective prosecution of the present war”;  but that is not necessarily 
the same thing. For instance, one can conceive of a position in which 
all danger to Australia has vanished, and yet the War – the same war – 
is still being prosecuted for the purpose of obtaining Constantinople 
for the Greeks or the Russians, or Jerusalem for the Jews, or Dalmatia 
                                                     
44 [1917] HCA 63, at 7. 
45 [1917] HCA 63, at 7. 
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for Italy. For aught that appears, the draughtsman may have thought 
that the constitutional limitations were suspended during the War, and 
that any Act aimed at the effective prosecution of the War would, 
under all circumstances and for all purposes, be treated as valid. But 
the constitutional limitations are not suspended; we have to decide in 
accordance with the Constitution …”47 
 
As to the majority’s reliance on Farey v Burvett, Higgins J pointed out 
that in deciding that case, and still, for him “the greatest care is needed in 
watching the attempts to extend the limits” of the defence power. There was 
“no reason whatever” to doubt the “propriety” of the decision, but the case did 
not lay down “the doctrine that any law … the Federal Parliament may make 
on any subject in time of war is valid”: 
 
“The Federal Parliament is not empowered by the Constitution to 
make any law that it likes for ‘the peace, order, and good government 
of Australia’;  but it is empowered to make any law for the peace, 
order, and good government of Australia ‘with respect to ... the naval 
and military defence of the Commonwealth’.”48 
 
In Farey v Burvett he had “applied his mind” to the three steps there under 
consideration, namely, Act, regulation and order:  
 
“The net result was that the price of bread was fixed, and under the 
authority of Parliament legislating with respect to defence. Power was 
conferred on the Governor-General to make regulations ‘for the more 
effectual prosecution of the War, or ‘the more effectual defence of the 
Commonwealth’ as to (inter alia) ‘the conditions (including times, 
places and prices) of the disposal or use of any property goods articles 
or things of any kind’.”49  
 
If the federal Parliament sought to pass a “private property protection” 
law, it must “at the very least”, show by “express words or necessary 
intendment” that it “regards the law as necessary or expedient for the 
distinctive object of the defence of Australia”;  namely, that “it is applying its 
mind to the defence of Australia”. A war for the defence of Australia could 
take place outside the country and “in distant part”, or in defence of “the 
Empire and of the world”, so that a law could in such circumstances be 
legitimate under the defence power. However, such a law might be exercised 
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lawfully or unlawfully. If exercised unlawfully, then the execution of such 
law would be invalid. This is what made the distinction between the present 
case and the Bread Case:  
 
“In the latter, the question was one of an executory power, ‘perhaps 
too wide in its tenor’ but which was exercised lawfully (so far as it 
appeared on the record) by the donee of the power, namely the 
Governor-General. In the former (the present case), the High Court 
was ‘dealing with a power executed – executed by Parliament, for a 
purpose which is not, taken by itself, sufficient in law under all 
circumstances – ‘the effective prosecution of the War’.”50 
 
Therefore, said Higgins J, the conviction must be quashed.  
With Higgins J in the minority, the appeal was dismissed. Adela 
Pankhurst – who had been released on bail pending appeal – was returned to 
prison, serving until January 1918 despite a petition carrying thousands of 
signatures.51 
That this was the outcome is not, however, an end to the matter. The 
conflation, on the part of the majority, of advocacy for smashing windows 
with selling bread at an inflated price, or a challenge to exporting wheat when 
the domestic price of bread lifts it out of workers’ grasp or severely reduces 
their ability to buy it, is questionable. This highlights the impact political 
considerations have upon judicial decision-making, particularly the impact of 
wartime on what is determined to be lawful and unlawful activity according to 
interpretation of law at the highest levels of the judiciary. 
  
COMMERCIAL CONDUCT VERSUS POLITICAL ACTION 
 
Even the most cursory look at Farey v Burvett confirms it as a very 
different case from that of Adela Pankhurst and her advocacy for breaking 
glass. Farey v Burvett was decided at the height of the war;  the decision in 
Pankhurst v Kiernan came down a full year before the Armistice was declared 
ending fighting on the Western Front. Farey v Burvett involved trading in the 
commercial arena for the making of profits in defiance of regulated prices;  
Pankhurst v Kiernan involved one woman’s defiance in the public streets.   
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Does the difference mean Higgins J’s dissent should have prevailed: that 
no justification lies in the defence power for federal legislation making 
unlawful the conduct for which Pankhurst was prosecuted, convicted and 
gaoled? Or was the majority view to be preferred: that “defence” supports a 
law sufficiently wide to penalise speech calling for the breaking of shop 
windows? 
Farey v Burvett’s popular shorthand title “the Bread Case” – used 
interchangeably by the High Court in Pankhurst v Kiernan – is not 
insignificant in assessing the strength of the arguments on both sides. Farey 
was fined for breaching a regulation prescribing the price for selling bread in 
Melbourne and its suburbs during wartime.   
Bread prices were regulated by the War Precautions Act 1914-1916 (Cth), 
authorising the Governor General to make regulations and orders he thought 
“desirable for the more effectual prosecution of the War, or the more effectual 
defence of the Commonwealth or of the realm”. Such regulations and orders 
were restricted to “prescribing and regulating” amongst other matters “the 
conditions (including times, places, and prices) of the disposal or use of any 
property goods articles or things of any kind”. On 24 March 1916, by 
regulation “proclaimed areas” were declared for the principal populated parts 
of Australia, measured by a 10 mile radius from Sydney and Melbourne 
General Post Offices (GPOs), and within lesser miles radius of the other 
capital cities and certain other districts. The Governor General was 
empowered to fix maximum prices for sale of bread and flour in the 
proclaimed areas. Farey’s conviction resulted from his selling bread in a 
proclaimed area at a price higher than that set by the Governor General. In 
other words, he was engaged in profiteering. 
In the words of Griffith CJ, did the defence power (s. 51(vi)) warrant “all 
this legislative action” and, hence, the conviction? The defence power 
provided no scope for the federal Parliament to regulate food prices during 
peacetime. This lay with the states.52 The contention for Farey was that the 
defence power allowed regulation of food prices or “necessaries of life” 
during war only insofar as relating directly to the armed forces or military 
operations, not to the needs of the civilian population or, as Isaacs J put it: 
 
“The contention, and the only contention, on behalf of the appellant, is 
that even in time of war, whatever be the national exigency, it is 
wholly incompetent to the Commonwealth Parliament to make any 
provision with respect to the sale of the necessaries of life, except so 
far as relates directly to the armed forces or some actual military 
operation. The needs of the civil population, it is said, are altogether 
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outside the limits of Commonwealth protection, because within the 
meaning of the Australian Constitution no scheme of national defence 
can possibly comprehend them. Monopoly, according to the argument 
gravely presented, may lay the community under private contribution, 
may sap their energies or unconscionably reduce their means of living, 
with the most direct consequences of impeding the nation in its 
struggle for existence, and yet the national Government, charged by 
the Constitution with the duty of universal defence, is by the same 
instrument forbidden to remove the impediment. The remedy 
suggested for such an evil is in the State powers.”53  
 
However, state powers rather than federal intervention was, for the High 
Court as a whole, no answer. For Isaac J: 
 
“…though the States may, in directions not contravening express 
prohibitions, most advantageously act by means of their own 
constitutional powers in aid of the common object, yet this possibility 
does not ensure a remedy at all, and certainly does not ensure a 
remedy on broad national lines, with unity of purpose and action, even 
if the requisite knowledge were always possessed by the State 
authorities to enable them to appreciate the necessities of the entire 
situation.”54 
 
In accordance with the principle established by the US Supreme Court in 
M’Culloch v. Maryland,55 as adopted in Jumbunna Coal Mine, No Liability v. 
Victorian Coal Miners Association,56 the federal Parliament must have a 
discretion to make laws in “the manner most beneficial to the people” so long 
as, within the context of the particular power, the end is legitimate and all 
means employed to the end are not prohibited, are appropriate, and are 
consistent with the letter and spirit of the Constitution. In affirming this, 
Griffith CJ, said that measures for defence “includes preparation for war in 
time of peace and any such action in time of war as may conduce to the 
successful prosecution of the war and defeat of the enemy”. It was “obvious” 
that the question “whether a particular legislative act is within [the defence 
power] may fall to be determined upon very different considerations in time 
of war and time of peace”. However “… any measure which may have the 
effect of tending to secure an adequate food supply to Great Britain during the 
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War, and so increasing, or preventing the diminution of, the resources of that 
part of the Empire would be a measure tending also to the more efficient 
defence of the Commonwealth as a part of it”.57 This followed because 
Australia’s defence and security in time of war was dependent upon that of 
Great Britain.  
Further, said Griffith CJ, the power to legislate on defence extended “… 
to any law which may tend to the conservation or development of the 
resources of the Commonwealth so far as they can be directed to success in 
war, or may tend to distress the enemy or diminish his resources, as, for 
instance, by the prohibition of trading with him or with persons associated 
with him”.58 The power to make laws with respect to defence being a 
paramount power, if coming into conflict with state powers – that is, powers 
not granted to the federal Parliament through the Constitution, then the latter 
must give way.  
Crucially, however, in Farey v Burvett the entire tenor of the judgments of 
each of the seven High Court justices – identical with the bench in the Adela 
Pankhurst cases, apart from the presence of the Chief Justice – was as to the 
centrality of resources and their significance in terms of the war effort, for the 
“control of finance or trade may be the most potent weapon of all”: 
 
“History as well as common sense tells us how infinitely various the 
means may be of securing efficiency in war. Sumptuary laws have 
always been common war measures. No one would dispute that the 
regulation of the supply and price of food in a beleaguered city would 
be a proper, and might be a necessary, war measure. The legislative 
act now in question is in substance a sumptuary law.”59 
 
Emphasised time and again, particularly by Griffith CJ, it was, however, 
essential to apply a principal test: 
 
“Can the measure in question conduce to the efficiency of the forces 
of the Empire, or is the connection of cause and effect between the 
measure and the desired efficiency so remote that the one cannot 
reasonably be regarded as affecting the other?”60 
 
This was the test at the forefront for Higgins J in Pankhurst v Kiernan, in 
his observation that Farey was convicted in the Bread Case under legislation 
coming before Parliament after Melbourne wharf labourers had refused to 
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load flour onto ships sailing to Great Britain and allied countries until the 
price of bread in Australia was reduced: 
 
“[Melbourne wharf labourers] were persuaded to abandon this attitude 
and to trust to Parliament; and Parliament may well have considered 
that in providing for the fixing of prices they were providing for ‘the 
more effectual defence of the Commonwealth’ [as the section 
expressly averred] by ‘securing cheap bread and the supply of food for 
Great Britain and her Allies and the allied armies’ …”61  
 
Patently, this was not so with the law said to support the Pankhurst 
conviction. For Higgins J the heart of the matter lay in whether or not there 
was a link between smashing windows – or, more specifically, advocating 
their destruction, and the pursuit of the war effort or sustaining Australia’s 
defence. There was, for him, no such link nor the shadow of one.  
Then to Barton and Isaacs JJ’s proposition that the position in the United 
States sustained and supported the notion that destruction of shop windows 
was a matter of “defence”. It was here that Isaacs J found support in the 
Federal Food Control Act, observing that states’ rights in the US are “even 
more extensive than in Australia” and that albeit “necessaries” was defined in 
the US Act, “being a matter of legislative discretion”, its scope could have 
been extended.62 
Higgins J joined issue, explicitly challenging reliance upon the United 
States’ position. Albeit the Civil War of 1861-1865 led to a “severe strain” on 
the limits of the Presidential and Congressional powers of the United States, 
with a “host of crimes … not previously punishable by law” being created, he 
said, there was “no trace of any Statute making it illegal to injure or to 
encourage injury of private property”. So far as he could discern, there was 
“no precedent in any defence legislation of Congress for any such legislation 
as we have here to consider”. In the present war, Congress had legislated for 
sale of wheat, flour, meal, beans and potatoes by the President “at reasonable 
prices”, together with “fixing the prices of coal and coke”. Furthermore (as 
with Farey v Burvett) the US legislation conferring this power “expressly 
recited” the measure as being “essential to the national security and 
defence”.63 
However, for Isaacs J, section 4 was “if possible, more clearly than 
Farey’s Case within the ambit of [federal] power, because the destruction of 
or injury to property – including bread – involves its utter waste to the 
community, and consequently is much more serious than a rise in price, which 
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still assumes the possibility of obtaining and using the commodity”.64 Yet it is 
ironic that “including bread” should have been noted by Isaacs J at this point, 
and it shows the slippage involved in the endeavour to bring Adela 
Pankhurst’s case within the scope of the earlier decision: for bread was not in 
issue here;  shop windows were.  
None of the other judges in Pankhurst v Kiernan confronted the nub of the 
problem. Even though Isaacs J sought to do so, notably he – as with the other 
four – avoided addressing the very substance of the difference between the 
legislation in question in Farey v Burvett and its application to the offence 
there in question, and the legislation said to apply to Adela Pankhurst – and 
the conduct asserted to bring her within the scope of the defence power. He 
did endeavour to countermand the notion that section 4 was “too wide” in its 
reference to “property”. Hence, on the contention that because “some property 
might be unsuitable for war purposes, yet such property is covered by the 
section”, he constructed a twofold answer: 
 
“First, no one can ever say that anything is useless for war purposes, 
even in the narrowest sense;  but next, and chiefly, all property in 
Australia is part of our national resources, or, in the language of [The 
Zamora’s] Lord Stowell, part of the ‘common stock’ to which the 
Australian people – one people in war, and for that purpose knowing 
no State divisions – have a right to regard collectively as its means of 
support in every way for the purposes of this war, both in the lines and 
behind them.”65  
 
Yet for Higgins J this was no answer.  
 
Nor can it go unremarked that Farey v Burvett lacked any reference or 
even allusion to circumstances within the defence power having any parallel 
with the scope contested for by the majority in Pankhurst v Kiernan, Griffith 
CJ cited two examples:66 
 
• … a Commonwealth law enacting that any person plying for hire with 
a boat or launch in any harbour or river in the Commonwealth shall 
obtain a licence from a Commonwealth officer. Such a law, if passed 
in time of profound peace, could not possibly be regarded as a law 
substantially dealing with defence. An identical law passed in time of 
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war, and limited in its operation to the duration of the war, might 
obviously be a necessary war precaution. 
 
• … a law passed by the Commonwealth Parliament in time of 
profound peace prohibiting the accumulating of food stuffs 
(“forestalling” or, today, “hoarding”) could not be regarded as 
substantially an exercise of the defence power. In time of war the 
same act might well be made a capital offence. 
 
Transport and food are easily assessed as crucial to defence and with a 
connection to it – troop and cargo (equipment) movements, maintenance and 
upkeep of defence forces, control of waterways and traffic on waterways, 
ensuring a proper supply of foodstuffs – all directly relevant to the 
prosecution of war or “defence of the realm”, all with an identifiable link. 
The principle that a law relating to defence would need to be seen as being 
capable of “conducing to the more effectual prosecution of the War” was 
crucial for Griffith CJ. The Court could, he said, take judicial notice of the 
fact that the past season's harvest “was most abundant”, with “vast quantities 
of wheat, far exceeding the possible consumption of the Commonwealth”, 
awaiting export, whilst wartime meant “the supply of freight is deficient”. 
Therefore, for economical and “other reasons” exporting surplus to the United 
Kingdom or the allied nations “may be highly desirable for the more efficient 
prosecution of the War”. It seemed to follow, he concluded, that any law 
“which may tend, with or without the aid of other measures, to encourage 
such export may be conducive to the more efficient conduct of the War”.67 
 
WARTIME EXIGENCY VERSUS FREE SPEECH 
 
Where do Pankhurst v Porter and Pankhurst v Kiernan stand in the 
potential for politics to play a role in decision-making of police, prosecution 
and courts during wartime? To those who see the law and particularly judicial 
decision-making as above socio-political sensibilities, it may be unsettling to 
focus upon why Adela Pankhurst and, in Pankhurst v Porter, her companions, 
might be seen as subject to such a contingency.  
Yet the prosecution in Pankhurst v Porter signified a watershed. Prior to 
this, wartime demonstrators, including Pankhurst, were prosecuted under state 
or “civilian” laws.68 The new approach confirmed a decision that it was time 
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to make an example of these agitators through condemnation under defence 
laws. Then, in arresting and prosecuting the women under Regulation 27, 
police and prosecution decided the women engaged in “pretext”. Had the 
women’s calls for action been accepted as embodying a genuine concern 
about prices taking food out of the “ordinary” labourer and housewife’s reach, 
the trio would have been prosecuted for engaging in just that purpose. 
“Pretext” – or as the High court put it, “sham” – would not have been in issue.  
By “pretext”, the prosecution asserted the three pretended concern about 
prices, poverty and food for the poor, using their platform to agitate, stir up 
trouble, court publicity. Barton J himself cast doubt upon the women’s bona 
fides: “I do not think that, whatever may be the fact, the evidence shows that 
[‘pretext’ exists here]”.69 He alluded to the “gaining of notoriety” as a possible 
basis for a prosecution under “pretext”.  
This embodies stereotypes of women in the public and political arena, and 
general stereotypes of women qua women. Historically, women have been 
expected to be and remain silent, to defer to fathers and husbands, not take up 
causes.70 As for “women as women”, embedded in the law is the notion that 
women are not to be trusted, mendacity being seen as an inherently female 
trait.71 Such stereotypes held sway in 1917. In dismissing the appeal in the 
lower courts Judge Johnston said that in a conflict of testimony the Magistrate 
had to determine which evidence he would accept and “felt no doubt that he 
should accept that of the police as against that of a number of highly strung 
women …”72  
In Pankhurst v Porter, the prosecution misfired. This meant that in 
Pankhurst v Kiernan, Adela Pankhurst was faced with a Court which had 
been obliged, upon the evidence, to exculpate her once. Could the Court 
countenance exculpation for a second time, particularly as this time, she stood 
without fellow miscreants?  
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Adela Pankhurst was vulnerable in coming alone before the High Court in 
circumstances where only days before she, along with Suter and Baines, had 
won an acquittal. Her continuing defiance of the war whatever the cost and 
refusal to obey measures said to be in support of war, particularly in ignoring 
or even promoting hunger and poverty amongst the civilian population, was a 
clear affront to those in power. The authorities’ desire for an example to be 
made was a matter of notoriety. That Pankhurst was both a leader and a 
charismatic character was on record Australia-wide and throughout the 
Empire. Her exploits were reported at home and abroad. Her mother’s view of 
her conduct was sought, with predictable maternal condemnation.73 The Prime 
Minister, Billy Hughes, publicly and privately spoke of deporting her.74  
That judges are distanced from the social and political realities, from 
assumptions, stereotypical perspectives, their own socialisation, and pressures 
of the times in which they sit is not infrequently contradicted by judicial 
pronouncements from the bench. Judgments relating to cases involving 
women, whether sexual offences or marital killings,75 or social security and 
welfare fraud76 are cited in this regard. More generally, so too are cases with 
political implications – the trials and appeals of alleged IRA bombers, for 
example.77 
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Pankhurst v Kiernan involved a defiant woman with an overtly political 
cause. It is impossible not to be struck by the failure of the majority 
judgments to address adequately or at all the question of a link between 
smashing windows and defence. The judges engage in complete omission or, 
as with Isaac J, elision or sleight of hand.  Higgins J alone turned his mind to 
the matter explicitly in issue. For him, it was clear. As Barton J said in 
Pankhurst v Kiernan the function of the High Court in deciding whether a law 
purporting to be made under section 51(vi) of the Constitution was indeed 
valid, was “to say whether the form of law had been given to something 
which was capable of assisting defence”.78 Neither he, nor four of his brother 
judges, followed this path. 
Yet if Adela Pankhurst had advocated the smashing of windows, 
intentionally and without compunction for the damage it would cause should 
her listeners bow to her advocacy – as all six judges had agreed, the 
prosecutorial decision was clear. State laws for the protection of property 
were the answer. State, civilian law was the non-political pathway to 
prosecution. 
Higgins J’s dissent took the politics out of judicial decision-making. That 
his brethren followed a path of upholding the conviction, despite the lack of 
connection between the defence power and what Adela Pankhurst was found 
to have said and done, confirms that political considerations are not remote 
from judicial decisions made during times of war and dissent. 
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